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Knickerbocker (1973) introduced the notion of oligopolistic reaction to
explain why ﬁrms follow rivals into foreign markets. We develop a model
that incorporates central features of Knickerbocker’s story—oligopoly, uncer-
tainty, and risk aversion—to establish the conditions required to generate
follow-the-leader behavior. We ﬁnd that rival foreign investment will make
risk-neutral ﬁrms less inclined to move abroad once its rivals have done so.
We show that Knickerbocker’s prediction relies on risk aversion and derive
an expression for the minimum amount of risk aversion needed to generate
oligopolistic reaction.
1. Introduction
Research on foreign direct investment (FDI) has long recognized
two important motives for choosing a particular country as the site
for a new facility. First, ﬁrms wish to gain improved access to that
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country’s market. A local plant can lower transportation costs or
circumvent barriers to trade. Second, ﬁrms want to deploy the rela-
tively abundant factors located in the country. That is, they seek a low-
cost production platform. In his 1973 book, Frederic Knickerbocker
proposed a third motivation in location choice: ﬁrms might invest
in a country to match a rival’s move. In particular, Knickerbocker
argued that ﬁrms in industries characterized by oligopoly would tend
to follow each other’s location decisions.
We deﬁne oligopolistic reaction (OR) as follows: The decision of
one ﬁrm to invest overseas raises competing ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in
the same country. Essentially, we want to know whether, within the
structure proposed in Knickerbocker, FDI decisions are strategic com-
plements. Following the terminology of the ﬁeld of industrial orga-
nization, ﬁrms’ actions are strategic complements when an increase in
the action of one ﬁrm raises the marginal beneﬁt of an increase in the
action for another ﬁrm.
Despite the strong recognition that Knickerbocker’s hypothesis
has attracted in the international business and strategy literature,
there is surprisingly little formal examination of the conditions that
give rise to OR. This paper develops a model that incorporates
important elements of Knickerbocker’s framework—oligopoly, uncer-
tainty, and risk aversion—to evaluate the conditions required for OR
to hold. We show that when uncertainty exists about costs in the
foreign market, a sufﬁciently risk-averse oligopolist is more likely to
establish a manufacturing facility in a foreign country once its rivals
have invested there. Hence, strong risk aversion makes FDI decisions
strategic complements and Knickerbocker’s proposition holds. We
ﬁnd that uncertainty and risk aversion are essential ingredients for
obtaining OR. In the case of certainty, the incentive to move abroad
falls with rival investment there. Moreover, uncertainty coupled with
risk neutrality reinforces the desire not to follow a rival into a foreign
market. The analysis deﬁnes the level of risk aversion necessary for
Knickerbocker’s hypothesis to hold in terms of the parameters of
the model. This indicates how the likelihood of OR is inﬂuenced
by changes in the degree of uncertainty, the number of ﬁrms in the
industry, and transportation costs. Our results, therefore, can provide
means for identifying the empirical relevance of Knickerbocker’s
hypothesis.
The persistent inﬂuence of oligopolistic reaction is underscored
by the 89 citations to Knickerbocker (1973) in journals published
between 1989 and 1999 according to the Social Science and Humanities
Citation Index. A number of papers cite Knickerbocker as a moti-
vation for adding speciﬁc covariates in regressions explaining FDI.
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Kogut and Chang (1991, 1996) use the eight-ﬁrm Japanese concen-
tration index in their analyses of Japanese FDI. They interpret the
positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of this variable in their 1991 study
as evidence of follow-the-leader behavior. Hennart and Park (1994)
and Yu and Ito (1988) add a measure of previous rival investment in
their analyses of Japanese FDI in the United States. It has a signiﬁcant
positive effect in latter paper but an insigniﬁcant effect in the former.
The relevance of the OR hypothesis extends beyond the interna-
tional business literature to the economic literature identifying sources
of strategic complementarity in investment decisions. Firms obtain
greater proﬁts from clustering than from dispersing when there exist
positive spillovers (agglomeration economies) between ﬁrms locat-
ing in geographic proximity. Fujita and Thisse (1996) provide a thor-
ough overview the sources of agglomeration economies. Caves (1991)
introduces the idea of mergers as strategic complements, an idea for-
malized in Fauli-Oller (2000). Fauli-Oller shows that in a Cournot
oligopoly, a ﬁrm’s incentive to merge is decreasing in the number of
outside ﬁrms. Thus, mergers between two ﬁrms will increase the like-
lihood of subsequent mergers. Flaherty and Raubitschek (1990) show
that follow-the-leader behavior will occur when the leader’s invest-
ment lowers the ﬁxed costs of subsequent investment of rivals.
Other papers focus on the role of uncertainty in generating imi-
tative behavior in investment decisions. Banerjee (1992) models herd
behavior occurring when the action of an agent conveys positive infor-
mation about an uncertain investment. Bikhchandani et al. (1998) refer
to the situation in which agents use observable actions of others to
infer unobservable signals about the desirability of a choice as an
informational cascade. They argue that such cascades may help us to
understand imitation in a large number of contexts. Aron and Lazear
(1990) and Cabral (1999) develop models where payoffs depend on
rank-order position. “First to the post” competition compels the trail-
ing ﬁrm to undertake risky actions that are matched by the leading
ﬁrm. In their models, like ours, the convexity of the payoff function
is an important determinant of ﬁrm behavior. In our model, however,
payoffs are determined by Cournot competition and ﬁrms value indi-
vidual proﬁts rather than rank order.
A common element of this literature predicting strategic com-
plementarity is that ﬁrms imitate because they expect it to raise
their proﬁts. In contrast, in our interpretation of Knickerbocker’s
hypothesis, ﬁrms choose the same locations despite the result that
this lowers their expected proﬁts. This occurs when highly risk-averse
ﬁrms try to avoid scenarios in which their rival has a cost advantage.
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The practical relevance of OR, therefore, depends on the degree of
risk aversion characterizing ﬁrms’ decision making.
To our knowledge, no formal mathematical models of OR exist
that incorporate the features of Knickerbocker’s thesis that we focus
on. However, other authors have worked on models that they relate
to Knickerbocker’s hypothesis. Motta (1994) examines sequential FDI
location decisions of oligopolists when products are vertically differ-
entiated. He shows that both oligopolists in a country may choose
FDI over exports to serve foreign customers, a result he states is
consistent with Knickerbocker’s hypothesis. He acknowledges, how-
ever, that his model does not demonstrate that follower investment
is in response to the FDI of the leader ﬁrm. Aussilloux (1998) also
relates the FDI export decision in a sequential entry Stackelberg game
to Knickerbocker’s hypothesis. Here again, however, the incentive to
invest is not positively related to the number of ﬁrms that previ-
ously chose to invest. Graham (1998) develops a model with rivalrous
behavior that he refers to as “exchange-of-threat.” This model gives
rise to reciprocal FDI by oligopolists based in different countries, a
phenomenon that differs from the follow-the-leader behavior contem-
plated by Knickerbocker.
The following section describes the model and positions the
analysis in terms of FDI decisions as strategic substitutes or com-
plements. It speciﬁes the imperfect-competition model we employ
and expresses the proﬁts associated with the strategy of maintaining
home production and the strategy of relocating production abroad.
We establish the main results about FDI decisions as strategic comple-
ments or substitutes in Section 3. We obtain results for three scenarios:
(1) perfect information, (2) cost uncertainty and risk-neutral ﬁrms,
and (3) cost uncertainty and risk-averse ﬁrms. Section 4 examines the
equilibrium location of ﬁrms. In the ﬁnal section, we summarize our
results and discuss their implications for observed patterns of FDI.
2. Framework
We construct our model to reﬂect key features of Knickerbocker’s
(1973) argument. The ﬁrst important aspect is oligopoly. We model
Cournot oligopolists that choose between producing at home and
abroad. A second feature of Knickerbocker’s framework is uncer-
tainty about economic conditions in the foreign market. The follower is
“uncertain of the production economies, if any, that it [the leading ﬁrm]
might gain by manufacturing locally” (p. 26). Accordingly, we allow
for uncertainty about production costs in the foreign country. Finally,
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Knickerbocker points to the role of risk aversion: “ﬁrms minimized
their risk by matching the foreign direct investment of rivals” (p. 30).
We consider a ﬁrm’s objective function in which variability of proﬁts
enters negatively.
We believe Knickerbocker’s basic thesis is best described in the
following passage explaining how a ﬁrm lowers risk by following a
rival into a foreign market:
To illustrate, if ﬁrm B [the follower] matched, move for
move, the acts of its rival, ﬁrm A [the leader], B would
have roughly the same chance as A to exploit each foreign
market opportunity. Thus for each new market penetrated
by both A and B, B’s gains, either in terms of earnings
or in terms of the acquisition of new capabilities, would
parallel those of A. If some of A’s moves turned out to be
failures, B’s losses would be in the range of those of A.
Neither ﬁrm would be better or worse off. From the point
of view of ﬁrm B, this matching strategy guaranteed that its
competitive capabilities would be roughly in balance with
those of ﬁrm A. (Knickerbocker, 1973, pp. 24–25)
We model a two-country, N -ﬁrm oligopoly. Each ﬁrm operates
a single plant, and there are initially nh plants (or ﬁrms) located in
the home country and nf plants in a foreign country (thus a total of
N = nh + nf ﬁrms). We consider a representative ﬁrm that operates
in the home country but contemplates relocating production to the
foreign country.1 The markets in the two countries are segmented, and
ﬁrms sell to both markets. We are interested in the beneﬁt associated
with relocating production to f and how foreign investment by rival
home-market ﬁrms affects this beneﬁt.
We incorporate uncertainty into our model by assuming that
ﬁrms do not know the marginal cost of producing in the foreign coun-
try. Prior to relocating, a home ﬁrm perceives foreign marginal cost as
a random variable. We assume that ﬁrms learn this cost following the
relocation decision but prior to setting outputs.
As mentioned earlier, oligopolistic reaction can be thought
of in terms of FDI decisions being strategic complements. Bulow
et al. (1985) deﬁne strategic complementarity as the case where
the cross partial of the payoffs with respect to each ﬁrm’s strategic
1 Alternatively, the ﬁrm might retain its domestic plant and add a foreign plant to
serve local demand through local production. Whether this would be optimal depends
on plant-level economies of scale, transportation costs, and demand. In the appendix,
we show that the qualitative results of the analysis are robust to either speciﬁcation
of FDI.
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variable is positive. We will specify a beneﬁt function B expressing
the difference in payoffs of a representative ﬁrm keeping its home
plant vs. relocating it to the foreign country. The beneﬁt function
incorporates risk aversion to uncertain costs associated with produc-
ing in the foreign country. We will analyze how the beneﬁt function
is inﬂuenced by an increase in the share of ﬁrms that have chosen
to relocate production to the foreign market. We denote this share
as x ≡ nf /N . Thus, we view our approach as the discrete-choice
(since B is a difference rather than a derivative), N -ﬁrm analog of the
condition proposed by Bulow et al. OR obtains when FDI decisions
are strategic complements, i.e., when ∂B/∂x > 0. Reverse OR occurs if
∂B/∂x < 0.
Bulow et al. examine a duopoly where a shock occurs that
directly affects the level of a strategic variable chosen by ﬁrm 1. They
show that when the strategic variables are complements, a positive
shock to one ﬁrm’s choice of strategic variable will increase the equi-
librium level of the other ﬁrm’s strategic variable. In our framework,
we also have in mind the existence of shocks that inﬂuence the strate-
gic variable—whether to relocate production abroad—of particular
ﬁrms. Suppose there are sunk costs of relocation that vary across ﬁrms
and time. For example, improved information may reduce relocation
costs, and some ﬁrms may be better equipped to take advantage of
these lower costs. These changes will make it proﬁtable for some
ﬁrms to relocate, thereby increasing x. As x changes, the expected
beneﬁts of FDI for remaining ﬁrms will rise or fall depending on
whether FDI decisions are strategic complements or substitutes.
We assume that for i = h f , the inverse demand functions are
given by Pi = ai−biQi. If ﬁrms in the same location behave identically,
we have
Qi = xNqfi + (1− x)Nqhi
the ﬁrst subscript denoting location of the ﬁrm and the second the
country where the output is sold.
We allow for different unit costs of production ci between coun-
tries, and for trade to be subject to a transport cost t. We also assume
ﬁxed production cost per plant equal to G and a sunk cost F of setting
up a new plant. The foreign marginal cost cf is a country-speciﬁc ran-
dom variable with mean c¯f and variance σ 2. This assumption is the
simplest way to capture the realistic idea that ﬁrms are able to predict
costs at home without much difﬁculty but cannot accurately predict
their costs in a foreign environment. It also makes the strong assump-
tion that ﬁrms’ costs in the foreign country are perfectly correlated
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with each other. The latter aspect of the model is designed to make
a point with minimal algebra rather than to reﬂect reality. However,
many types of uncertainty, such as real-exchange-rate risk or the risk
of political upheaval, would in fact cause costs of all foreign ﬁrms to
shift in a common way. As described earlier, ﬁrms learn cf following
the relocation decision but prior to setting outputs.
The realized proﬁts of a representative home ﬁrm depend on
whether it locates in country h or f . Denoting the proﬁts of a ﬁrm
that stays at home as πS and the proﬁts of a ﬁrm that relocates to the
foreign country as πR, we obtain
πS = (Ph − ch)qhh + (Pf − ch − t)qhf −G (1)
πR = (Ph − cf − t)qfh + (Pf − cf )qff −G− F (2)
Firms are Cournot competitors in segmented markets, as in Brander
and Krugman (1983) or Horstmann and Markusen (1992). Equilibrium
quantities to each market for a ﬁrm maintaining production at home
are
qhh =
ah − ch −Nx(ch − cf − t)
bh(N + 1)
 (3)
qhf =
af − ch − t −Nx(ch − cf + t)
bf (N + 1)
 (4)
Proﬁts earned from this strategy are
πS = bhq2hh + bf q2hf −G (5)
Now consider the proﬁtability of relocation. If a home ﬁrm were to
move to the foreign country, it would increase the number of ﬁrms
operating there by one. Equilibrium quantities shipped to each market
by a ﬁrm producing in the foreign market are given by
qfh =
ah − cf − t + [N(1− x)− 1](ch − cf − t)
bh(N + 1)
 (6)
qff =
af − cf + [N(1− x)− 1](ch − cf + t)
bf (N + 1)
 (7)
Proﬁts earned from this strategy are
πR = bhq2fh + bf q2ff −G− F (8)
We assume that outputs qhh qhf  qff , and qfh are positive for all distri-
butions of ﬁrms, x, across the two countries. This assumption allows
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us to take derivatives of proﬁts with respect to x without running into
corner conditions on outputs.2
We suppose that the decision makers in the ﬁrm maximize a
weakly concave utility function of their income in which proﬁts from
the multinational enterprise’s activities constitute a substantial portion
of income. In that case, they desire higher expected proﬁts but dis-
like greater variance of proﬁts. We consider the highly tractable case
of negative-exponential utility deﬁned over a normally distributed
monetary wealth, i.e., we suppose that utility over proﬁts can be
expressed as
U = − exp(−λπ)
where λ is the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion. If π were normally
distributed, the expected utility [after a monotone transformation; see
Varian (1992)] could be expressed as
E[U] = E[π]− λ
2
V[π]
where E and V are the mean and variance operators. Thus, we can
express the beneﬁt function, B, representing the gain in expected util-
ity associated with relocating relative to staying, as
B = E[UR]− E[US] = E[πR]− E[πS]+ λ
2
(
V[πS]− V[πR]) (9)
3. Best Responses to Rival FDI Decisions
We wish to determine the sign of the derivative of the FDI beneﬁt
function with respect to the share of ﬁrms in the foreign country, x.
To evaluate this derivative, it is useful to express it as the sum of two
differences:
∂B
∂x
=
(
∂E[πR]
∂x
− ∂E[π
S]
∂x
)
+ λ
2
(
∂V[πS]
∂x
− ∂V[π
R]
∂x
)
 (10)
We begin by evaluating the terms involving expected proﬁts. This
corresponds to how x inﬂuences the incentive of a risk-neutral ﬁrm
(λ = 0) to relocate.
To express the expected proﬁts associated with staying at home
vs. those of moving abroad, we apply expectations to equations (5)
2 To maintain all quantities positive requires some conditions on the values of the
models’ parameters. These conditions are assumed to be fulﬁlled throughout the paper,
and all numerical examples respect them.
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and (8) and apply the statistics rule that E[X2] = (E[X])2 + V[X] to
each of the E[q2ij] terms. This yields
E[πS] = bh(E[qhh])2 + bf (E[qhf ])2 + bhV[qhh]+ bfV[qhf ]−G (11)
E[πR] = bh(E[qfh])2 + bf (E[qff ])2 + bhV[qfh]+ bfV[qff ]−G− F (12)
Since quantities are a linear function of costs, the ﬁrst two terms in
each expression represent the variable proﬁts obtained when the for-
eign marginal cost equals its expected value. We specify total prof-
its by substituting the expected foreign marginal cost, c¯f , in place
of cf in each quantity equation and then substituting the result into
equations (5) and (8). We denote these proﬁts as π¯S and π¯R. Subtract-
ing the expected proﬁt of staying in country h from that of relocating
to country f , we obtain the difference in expected proﬁts as
E[πR]−E[πS] = (π¯R−π¯S)+bh
(
V[qfh]−V[qhh]
)+bf (V[qff ]−V[qhf ]) (13)
The ﬁrst term of this expression portrays the change in proﬁts when
the foreign marginal cost equals its expected value. The rest of the
expression depends on the variance of costs in the foreign market, σ 2.
We can now see how an increase in x affects the difference in
expected proﬁts:
∂E[πR]
∂x
− ∂E[π
S]
∂x
=
(
∂π¯R
∂x
− ∂π¯
S
∂x
)
+ bh
(
∂V[qfh]
∂x
− ∂V[qhh]
∂x
)
+ bf
(
∂V[qff ]
∂x
− ∂V[qhf ]
∂x
)
 (14)
We decompose these terms sequentially. The derivatives of the proﬁt
functions with respect to the locations of rivals are given by
∂π¯S
∂x
= 2bhq¯hh
∂q¯hh
∂x
+ 2bf q¯hf
∂q¯hf
∂x
 (15)
∂π¯R
∂x
= 2bhq¯fh
∂q¯fh
∂x
+ 2bf q¯ff
∂q¯ff
∂x
 (16)
The q¯ij correspond to the results of substituting c¯f for cf in equations
(3), (4), (6), and (7). Note that
∂q¯hh
∂x
= ∂q¯fh
∂x
= N(c¯f + t − ch)
bh(N + 1)
 (17)
∂q¯ff
∂x
= ∂q¯hf
∂x
= −N(ch + t − c¯f )
bf (N + 1)
 (18)
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Subtracting (15) from (16) and substituting using (17) and (18) yields
∂π¯R
∂x
− ∂π¯
S
∂x
= −2N
N + 1
[
(c¯f+t−ch)(q¯hh−q¯fh)+(ch+t−c¯f )(q¯ff−q¯hf )
]
 (19)
Substituting equilibrium quantities into equation (19), we have
∂π¯R
∂x
− ∂π¯
S
∂x
= −2N
2
(N + 1)2
(
(c¯f + t − ch)2
bh
+ (ch + t − c¯f )
2
bf
)
< 0 (20)
This establishes the ﬁrst result of the analysis, corresponding to the
case of zero variance in foreign marginal cost. An increase in the rival
FDI (x) lowers the incentive of a home ﬁrm to invest abroad; i.e.,
decisions to move overseas are strategic substitutes. In the context of
our model, certainty yields reverse OR.3
We now consider the remaining portion of equation (13) that
involves the variance of costs in order to evaluate its derivative with
respect to x. Applying the variance operator to the quantity equations
and collecting terms yields
bh(V[qfh]− V[qhh])+ bf (V[qff ]− V[qhf ]) =
N 2(1− 2x)σ 2
(N + 1)2
(
1
bh
+ 1
bf
)

Differentiating with respect to x, we obtain
bh
(
∂V[qfh]
∂x
− ∂V[qhh]
∂x
)
+ bf
(
∂V[qff ]
∂x
− ∂V[qhf ]
∂x
)
= −2N
2σ 2
(N + 1)2
(
1
bh
+ 1
bf
)
< 0 (21)
Thus, the second set of terms on the right-hand side of equation (14)
is negative for any σ 2 > 0. We have already shown in equation (20)
that the ﬁrst part of the equation is negative. This means that the over-
all effect of an increase in rival investment is to lower the expected
proﬁts associated with relocating a plant to the foreign country. There-
fore, we have established a second result corresponding to a special
case of our general formulation: When there is uncertainty about for-
eign costs, FDI decisions are strategic substitutes for risk-neutral ﬁrms.
Moreover, since the variance terms reinforce the negative ﬁrst term in
equation (14), the disincentive to follow a rival into a foreign market
3 This result depends in part on our partial-equilibrium approach, which takes
the distribution of consumer demand as given. Combes (1997) shows that if demand
responds endogenously to ﬁrm location decisions then strategic complementarity can
arise in a two-location Cournot oligopoly model.
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is higher under risk neutrality and uncertainty than is the case when
foreign costs are known in advance.
The intuition for this result comes from the convexity of the
proﬁt functions. Since proﬁt is proportional to quantity squared, an
increase in the variance in quantity (caused by increasing the variance
of costs) also increases the expected level of proﬁts. This is because
ﬁrms adjust quantity after they learn costs. If costs are high, they pro-
duce less, and if costs are low, they produce more. In general, a ﬁrm
increases the variance of its output by locating in the country with
fewest ﬁrms. What concerns us, however, is how the rivals’ relocation
abroad affects a home ﬁrm’s incentive to relocate. When x increases,
the foreign country has more plants and the home country has fewer
plants. Thus the variance of output associated with producing in the
foreign market falls and, correspondingly, the variance of home out-
put rises. Hence, the beneﬁt of following is reduced by the increase
in x.
We now return to equation (10) to evaluate the general for-
mulation allowing for risk aversion. Recall that it comprises two
differences:
∂B
∂x
=
(
∂E[πR]
∂x
− ∂E[π
S]
∂x
)
+ λ
2
(
∂V[πS]
∂x
− ∂V[π
R]
∂x
)

Since we have now established that the ﬁrst difference is negative,
what remains is to calculate the difference in the variance of prof-
its between moving and staying. To express these variances in terms
of x and σ 2 is not easy, since proﬁts are a quadratic function of for-
eign costs. Greene (1997, p. 67) provides a useful approximation. For
Y = f (X) the variance of Y equals [f ′(E[X])]2V[X] plus a second-
order term.4
Application of this approximation yields
V[πS] ≈ 4x
2N 2
(N + 1)2 (q¯hh + q¯hf )
2σ 2 (22)
V[πR] ≈ 4(1− x)
2N 2
(N + 1)2 (q¯fh + q¯ff )
2σ 2 (23)
Increases in the variance of foreign costs (σ 2) also increase the variance
of proﬁts. The difference in variances is given by
V[πS]−V[πR] ≈ 4N
2σ 2
(N + 1)2
{[
x(q¯hh+ q¯hf )
]2− [(1−x)(q¯fh+ q¯ff )]2} (24)
4 This formula is derived from a linear Taylor series expansion where the expansion
point is the average value of the uncertain variable, here c¯f . Using simulations, we
found the approximation of the variance to be accurate within 2%.
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What is the effect of shifting rivals to the foreign country on this
difference? If relocation of rivals lowers the variance of proﬁts of
foreign production relative to that of home production, then for a
sufﬁciently large amount of risk aversion we would obtain strategic
complementarity. However, the following expression shows that this
derivative cannot be signed without further restrictions:
sign
[
∂V[πS]
∂x
− ∂V[π
R]
∂x
]
=sign[xq¯2h+(1−x)q¯2f+D{x2q¯h−(1−x)2q¯f }]
where q¯i ≡ q¯ih + q¯if . The ﬁrst two terms in this derivative may be
viewed as the “direct” effect of changing x while holding outputs
constant. This effect is unambiguously positive and reveals that when
rivals move abroad and outputs remain constant, the variability
of proﬁts is reduced for a ﬁrm located in the foreign market and
increased for a ﬁrm located in the home market. The third term con-
siders the effect of a change in x on outputs of stayers and relocators.
It depends on
D ≡ N
N + 1
[
(c¯f − ch)
(
1
bh
+ 1
bf
)
+ t
(
1
bh
− 1
bf
)]

This “indirect” effect cannot be signed. Furthermore, under certain
extreme parameter values, the indirect effect may be a large enough
negative number so that it fully offsets the direct effect. In that case,
risk aversion does not generate OR. The circumstances under which
this occurs involve differences between the two countries in the slopes
of the demand curves (bh and bf ) and expected costs (ch and c¯f ). By
eliminating such differences, we remove the indirect effect and retain
only the unambiguous positive direct effect in order to identify sit-
uations where OR can actually occur. Thus we proceed to impose a
restriction on the parameters:
Similarity condition: bh = bf = b and c¯f = ch = c.
We now can take the derivative of equation (24) with respect to
x and substitute it into equation (10) to obtain
∂B
∂x
=
(
∂E[πR]
∂x
− ∂E[π
S]
∂x
)
+ 4λσ
2N 2
(N + 1)2
[
xq¯2h + (1− x)q¯2f
]
 (25)
where the term in large parentheses is negative as shown in equation
(14). OR will obtain if the positive second term is large enough to
dominate the negative ﬁrst term. Thus, it will occur in this framework
for sufﬁciently large values of λ.
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The relocation of rival production to the foreign market reduces
the variability of proﬁts of ﬁrms located in that market and increases
the variability of proﬁts of ﬁrms remaining in the home market. With
risk aversion, ﬁrms dislike increased variation in proﬁts. Thus, a suf-
ﬁciently large degree of risk aversion will make the negative effect on
utility of proﬁt variation dominate the positive effect of proﬁt varia-
tion on expected proﬁts. FDI decisions can be strategic complements
when there exists a sufﬁciently high degree of risk aversion. Thus,
risk-averse ﬁrms have the incentive to follow rivals into foreign mar-
kets, the behavior Knickerbocker refers to as oligopolistic reaction.
We are able to deﬁne the minimum amount of risk aversion nec-
essary to generate OR by setting equation (25) equal to zero:
λmin = b(N + 1)
2(1+ t2/σ 2)
(ah + af − 2c − t)2
 (26)
Equation (26) allows us to explore how the minimum level of λ
required to generate OR varies according to the exogenous model
parameters. First, it is decreasing in σ 2, indicating that the level of
risk aversion inducing ﬁrms to want to match rivals’ moves falls
when there is more uncertainty about costs in the foreign market.
Second, λ is increasing in transportation costs t. High transportation
costs make foreign goods relatively uncompetitive with goods pro-
duced at home. Thus, when transportation costs are high, ﬁrms are
less concerned that different realizations of the random foreign cost
variable will have a strong effect on proﬁts at home. Hence, there
is less incentive to match the moves of rivals. Finally, the expres-
sion shows that when the total number of ﬁrms (N ) increases, the
parameter measuring the degree of risk aversion must also increase
to yield the same incentive to invest. If managerial risk aversion is
randomly distributed in the investor populations, these comparative
statics indicate that OR will be more likely in industries characterized
by high levels of concentration, great variability in foreign costs, and
low transportation costs.
The results of two-stage games often depend on whether the
ﬁrms’ choices in the second stage of product market competition are
strategic substitutes or complements. We have used Cournot competi-
tion with linear demand where outputs are strategic substitutes. This
raises the issue of whether our results would generalize to Bertrand
competition with differentiated products in which prices are strate-
gic complements. We applied the model of price competition due to
Ottaviano et al. (2002), with linear demands for symmetric differen-
tiated products, to our two-stage game of location choice followed
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by competition in segmented product markets. Our calculations—
available on request—show that our results continue to hold in that
model. The intuition is that proximity of rivals is bad for proﬁts in
most imperfect-competition models. As a result, even when product-
market choices are strategic complements, location choices are strategic
substitutes unless the ﬁrm is quite risk-averse. Interestingly, we found
that the more differentiated the products made by each ﬁrm are, the
less risk aversion is required to generate OR.
The relationship between OR and market structure was a focus
of the empirical analysis of Knickerbocker. OR predicts the clustering
of FDI. Consequently, he derived a measure of spatial and temporal
clustering of FDI by industry. There are, of course, other sources of
FDI clustering. Firms would choose the same locations if certain coun-
tries were particularly attractive due to low costs or high demand.
Agglomeration economies can also generate clustering.
To distinguish OR from other sources of clustering, Knicker-
bocker related his measure of FDI clustering to industry Herﬁndahl
indexes. He argued that more concentrated industries would be more
likely to exhibit OR. Knickerbocker discovered a nonmonotonic rela-
tionship between FDI clustering and industry concentration. Speciﬁ-
cally, he found that clustering increased with industry concentration
except at high levels of concentration. “Tight” (highly concentrated)
oligopolies were less likely to concentrate FDI than “loose” (less con-
centrated) oligopolies. He explains this ﬁnding as resulting from the
collusive behavior of tight oligopolies.5 Our model suggests a posi-
tive relationship between industry concentration and OR. It does not
predict the nonmonotonic relationship found by Knickerbocker.
4. Equilibrium Location Choice
Thus far, we have examined how a rival’s FDI affects the expected
beneﬁt of relocating production abroad. In this section, we consider
the Nash equilibrium in location choice. A share x∗ in country f is a
Nash equilibrium if there is no incentive for a ﬁrm in either country to
switch locations unilaterally. For large numbers of ﬁrms, interior equi-
libria occur where B(x∗) = 0. However, we are interested in oligopoly
situations and must adapt the equilibrium condition accordingly. For
no ﬁrm in country h to want to relocate to country f , it must be the
case that B(x∗) ≤ 0. For no ﬁrm in country f to regret its reloca-
tion choice (and therefore wish to return to country h), we require
5 This explanation is, however, not easy to justify theoretically. See Friedman and
Thisse (1993).
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B(x∗ − 1/N) ≥ 0. For a corner solution with all ﬁrms at home, i.e.,
x∗ = 0, we drop the second condition and require only B(0) ≤ 0. Cor-
respondingly, a corner solution with all ﬁrms abroad, x∗ = 1, requires
only the second condition that B(1− 1/N) ≥ 0.
Allowing for uncertainty and risk aversion while imposing the
similarity condition, we solve for the difference in expected utility for
a ﬁrm in h between staying in the home country and relocating to f
and express it as
B = 2N
(N + 1)2b
([
N(σ 2 + t2)(1− 2x)+ t(af − ah − t)
]
− λσ
2N(1− 2x)(ah + af − 2c − t)2
(N + 1)2b
)
− F (27)
We plot equation (27) for different levels of λ, the risk aversion param-
eter, in Figure 1. This plot sets N = 4 ah = af = b = 1 c = 025,
t = 01 F = 0, and σ = 0025. The values of λ chosen in the plot
are those where the equilibrium pattern of ﬁrms’ location changes
given the parameters values stated above. In the case of risk neutral-
ity (λ = 0), the slope is negative, indicating that FDI decisions are
strategic substitutes.
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of increases in risk aversion on
both the magnitude and the sign of OR. As can be seen in (27), an
increase in λ from zero has the effect of rotating the B(x) curve coun-
terclockwise around the point where x = 12 . The sign of B( 12) depends
on af − ah − t. For the identical demand curves we use in the plot,
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the pivot point is therefore negative. With increases in λ, B(x) ﬂattens
and then becomes positive. Positive slopes indicate strategic comple-
mentarity and oligopolistic reaction. For the parameters in the plot,
FDI decisions become strategic complements for λ in excess of 216.84.
The ﬁgure also indicates the types of equilibria that are possible
in this four-ﬁrm example. For λ = 0, the unique equilibrium occurs
at x∗ = 12 , where it is evident that B(x∗) < 0 and B(x∗ − 14) > 0. Thus,
there will be two ﬁrms in each country. The intuition is that, under risk
neutrality, ﬁrms have an incentive to operate in the less concentrated
market, resulting in an equilibrium where each market is equally con-
centrated. This is consistent with the result in the location-theory lit-
erature showing that spatial proximity of competitors reduces prices
and proﬁts.6
As risk aversion increases, it will eventually be the case that
B( 14) < 0, resulting in a unique equilibrium of three ﬁrms at home
and one abroad. Further increases in λ will generate x∗ = 0 as the
unique equilibrium and then cause the slope to switch from negative
to positive. Eventually, higher λ’s will make the slope steep enough
to yield B( 34) ≥ 0, resulting in an equilibrium at x = 1. In this case,
if a ﬁrm believed that its three rivals would choose country f , then
it would want to do so as well. Thus, two different equilibria are
possible. In the ﬁrst, all ﬁrms remain at home; in the second, all ﬁrms
migrate to the foreign country. This is the most interesting parameter
range, since it predicts either a large cluster of FDI in the foreign
country or none at all. Two otherwise equal countries might have very
different levels of success in attracting investment. This is despite the
fact that there are no agglomeration economies—the direct effect of
clustering is still to lower expected proﬁts.
How realistic are the values of λ required to generate OR?
Kocherlakota’s (1996) survey article on the equity-premium puzzle
discusses the plausible range for the coefﬁcient of relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA). He argues that there is a consensus that the CRRA
should be less than 10 but that only values of 18 or more can explain
why equities have historically earned a 6% premium over risk-free
Treasury bills. In the mean-variance expected-utility function we have
used, λ is the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion. We can obtain
the implied CRRA by multiplying λ by proﬁts. For the numerical
example in the ﬁgure, OR obtains for a CRRA of about 10, and two
equilibria (x = 0 and x∗ = 1) exist for a CRRA above 15. We also
simulated the model using the utility function (1 − γ)−1π1−γ , where
γ is the CRRA. We calculate expected utility based on 10,000 draws
6 For a model with Cournot competition, see Anderson and Neven (1990, 1991).
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of cf . For 20 simulations, we ﬁnd on average that γ ≥ 17 yields OR
for all x and that γ = 22 is the minimum value of the CRRA required
for two equilibria. These values, while large, are in line with values
required to explain the equity-premium puzzle.
5. Conclusion
Knickerbocker’s OR hypothesis can be formalized in terms of FDI
decisions being strategic complements, a concept that is clearly
deﬁned in the industrial-organization literature. The idea that the
principal elements of the Knickerbocker story—oligopoly, uncer-
tainty, and risk aversion—can combine to generate follow-the-leader
investment behavior has intuitive appeal. The Cournot segmented-
market model we develop shows that the requirements for OR
are rather strict. The cases of certainty and uncertainty with risk
neutrality generate the opposite result—the beneﬁts of relocating a
plant abroad are reduced when rivals invest there ﬁrst. Only when
a large amount of risk aversion is introduced does OR occur. Even
with risk aversion, we show that parameter values in the model must
be restricted to guarantee the result.
Our investigation of equilibrium patterns of location reveals that
under reverse OR, there will be a tendency for investments of rival
ﬁrms to be dispersed across the two locations. OR, on the other hand,
can cause all ﬁrms to cluster in one location or the other. On the
surface, this suggests that observations of spatially concentrated FDI
lend empirical support to Knickerbocker’s hypothesis. However, to
verify such a claim would require distinguishing clustering due to
OR from other types of clustering such as those due to agglomeration
economies. Our analysis provides a potential means for identifying
clustering due to OR by demonstrating that risk-reducing imitation is
more likely in concentrated industries with low transportation costs
and high variability in foreign costs.
Appendix
The analysis in the body of the paper focuses on the potential relo-
cation of a single plant, thereby abstracting from the option of estab-
lishing a new plant while retaining production at the old plant. Firms
would choose a two-plant structure over single-plant operation when
transportation costs are high and the ﬁxed cost per plant, G, is low
relative to demand. In this appendix, we show that the results in the
paper are robust to a situation where ﬁrms choose between maintain-
ing a single plant at home and establishing a foreign plant to displace
exports and serve the foreign market.
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The proﬁt from staying in the home country remains
πS = (Ph − ch)qhh + (Pf − ch − t)qhf −G
However, when the ﬁrm adds a location in the foreign country while
maintaining its home plant, its proﬁts become
πA = (Ph − ch)qhh + (Pf − cf )qff − 2G− F
Note that the variable proﬁts in the home market are the same under
both strategies and that the two-plant ﬁrm does not export. The FDI
beneﬁt function is
B = E[UA]− E[US] = E[πA]− E[πS]+ λ
2
(V[πS]− V[πA])
where UA is the utility associated with establishing an additional
plant and, as before, US is the utility of maintaining a single plant
at home that serves both markets. We approximate the difference in
variances as
V[πS]− V[πA] ≈ 4N
2σ 2
(N + 1)2
{
[xq¯hf ]
2 − [(1− x)q¯ff ]2
}

The derivative of the beneﬁt function with respect to x is now
∂B
∂x
= − 4N
2
(N + 1)2
[
σ 2 + (ch + t − c¯f )2
2bf
− λσ 2
(
xq¯2hf + (1− x)q¯2ff +
tN
bf (N + 1)
x2q¯hf + (1− x)2q¯ff
)]

The factor in the brackets will be negative for sufﬁciently large values
of λ, making the full expression positive and yielding oligopolistic
reaction.
As with the speciﬁcation maintained in the body of the text,
reverse OR occurs in the restricted cases. In the case of certain costs
(σ 2 = 0), the derivative of the beneﬁt function with respect to x is
negative and we have reverse OR. Moreover, as before, the negative
effect of rival investment becomes larger when there is uncertainty
(σ 2 > 0) and risk neutrality (λ = 0).
Thus, we have established that regardless of whether FDI implies
relocating a single plant or opening a second plant in the foreign
country, reverse OR obtains in the case of certainty as well as the case
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of uncertainty with risk neutrality. A critical level of risk aversion is
necessary to result in OR.
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